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Nathaniel Anderson 
Honors Thesis: Egoism and the Repugnant Conclusion 
The repugnant conclusion has flummoxed philosophers since its appearance in such works 
as Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. The conclusion, that, for any world of people living very 
good lives, there is another, better, world of far more people living far worse lives, struck Parfit as 
deeply unintuitive, which drove him to label it repugnant.1 In section 1, I will explain the intuitions 
and arguments underlying the repugnant conclusion and discuss why several proposed solutions 
fail to satisfactorily avoid the repugnant conclusion. In section 2, I will argue that ethical egoism 
provides a plausible way to dodge the repugnance of the repugnant conclusion by denying that the 
repugnant conclusion gives rise to any ethical implications. Section 3 will be devoted to answering 
some of the most serious objections to ethical egoism, while an entire section, section 4, will 
address the particular objection that collective action dilemmas represent a fatal flaw in ethical 
egoism. Finally, section 5 will discuss the one-person repugnant conclusion and argue that it is not 
a fatal problem for the egoist response. 
The repugnant conclusion can come about from Parfit’s impersonal total principle, which 
states that, other things being equal, the outcome which contains the most of whatever makes a life 
worth living is the best outcome.2 This principle is a natural response to the challenge implicit in 
Parfit’s non-identity problem, and thus should not be discarded out of hand.3 If adopted, however, 
it makes explicit that any amount of quality of a life may be compensated for by a sufficient amount 
of lives of lower quality, which leads directly to the repugnant conclusion. A second, and stronger, 
argument for the repugnant conclusion comes from the so-called Mere Addition Paradox. Parfit 
                                                          
1 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 388 
2 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 387 
3 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 357-361 
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argues that adding people with lives worth living, even if they are only barely worth living, does 
not lower the value of a world. Thus, given a world A of 10 people living very good lives (+100), 
there is a world A+ containing ten people living very good lives (+100) and ten people living lives 
barely worth living (+1) which is not worse than A. In turn, there is a world B with 20 people 
living lives that are better than the average value of the lives in world A+, perhaps +55, which is 
better than world A+ because it is more equal and has a higher amount of whatever makes a life 
worth living. World B seems to be better than world A because B is better than A+, which, int 
turn, is not worse than A. Repeated applications of the principles, addition of people with lives 
barely worth living followed by leveling which increases the total value of lives, will eventually 
produce a world Z with a vast number of people living lives barely worth living. Therefore, the 
plausible principles of the mere addition paradox also produce the repugnant conclusion.4 
 
Section 1A-The Bounding Response 
One style of approach is to limit the amount of value which certain types of lives can 
contribute to the value of a world. Critical level theories, which postulate that lives below a certain 
threshold have value for the people who live them but not for the world, are one example. In 
“Resolving the Repugnant Conclusion,” Tyler Cowen develops another approach which suggests 
that bounding offers a way to avoid the repugnant conclusion.5 Bounding refers to setting a limit 
on a certain type of value. Cowen suggests that bounding the amount of value which lives barely 
worth living contribute to the value of the world blocks the repugnant conclusion in both the total 
utility derivation and the mere addition derivation. He further suggests that boundedness makes 
                                                          
4 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 419-441 
5 Tyler Cowen “Resolving the Repugnant Conclusion” in The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics, ed. 
by Torbjorn Tannsjo and Jesper Ryberg (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 81-97 
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sense in light of the value of societal flourishing or civilization which have holistic value. While 
he is correct that imposing a limit on the amount of value which certain types of lives can contribute 
to the value of a world, his bounding leads to severely unintuitive conclusions of its own, namely 
that a much smaller population with slightly better lives is better than a much larger population 
with slightly worse lives. 
The standard account of the life barely worth living, suggested by Parfit himself in Reasons 
and Persons, is the life of Muzak and potatoes. Cowen argues that we should bound the amount 
which such lives can contribute to the value of the world. He suggests that each tier of life might 
have a different bound, so that lives of muzak, potatoes, and yearly tennis matches might be able 
to add more value than the lives without the tennis matches.6 Thus, a world of fifty billion people 
enjoying muzak and potatoes might reach the maximum value of multiplying such lives and be 
worth only twenty billion units despite each life being worth more than four tenths of a unit to the 
person who lives it, while a world of fifty billion people, half of whom experience the yearly tennis 
match, might be worth forty-four billion units, twenty billion for the mere muzak and potato 
people, and another twenty-four billion representing the maximum value which could be 
contributed by the additional tennis match people. The bounded theory, however, maintains that 
lives worth living never have negative value, although the marginal value of each additional life 
may approach zero at some point. Thus, such a system of bounding has advantages over critical 
level theories which postulate that lives under the critical level detract from the value of a world, 
because it does not imply the sadistic conclusion, namely that a world with a certain number of 
people with lives not worth living could be better than a world with more people with lives worth 
                                                          
6 Cowen, “Resolving the Repugnant Conclusion,” 85-86 
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living.7 The bounded theory, then, can be thought of as a stronger version of the critical level 
theory. 
The bounded theory, however, runs into the same problems with thresholds which all 
critical level theories are susceptible to. Once a world reaches the bound for the type of life the 
people in that world have, its value caps out. That means that a world, A, of a trillion people getting 
muzak and potatoes might be worse than a world, B, of twenty-five billion who have the additional 
yearly tennis match. The marginal value of the tennis match, however, seems far too slight to imply 
that a life with it in world B is more than forty times better for the world than the life without it in 
world A. Now, it is true that thresholds exist in all theories which postulate that lives can be worth 
living or not worth living, but in most such theories the threshold is set at the point at which a life 
becomes worth living. While there is a similarly odd difference in value between lives just barely 
worth living and lives just barely not worth living, that threshold is less unintuitive than the 
thresholds in the bounded theory because there are presumably many more of them, and they lack 
even the limited explanatory force afforded by the vague idea of worth living versus not worth 
living. It seems possible that the threshold in most theories between worth living and not worth 
living could be clarified, perhaps by a question such as if you knew before your life began exactly 
what it would hold, but you would forget once your life began, would you choose to live that life? 
Cowen might reasonably argue that I have made the thresholds seem too slight, that a tennis match 
cannot be enough to elevate the muzak and potatoes life to another tier, but it seems that at some 
point something as small as a tennis match must make the difference between one level and the 
next. As Tim Mulgan has identified, the problem with such puzzles is that step differences in 
                                                          
7 Gustaf Arrhenius, “Critical-Level Theories” in Future Generation: A Challenge for Moral Theory, (uu-diva-
portal.org, 2000), https://www.academia.edu/3488242/Future_generations_A_challenge_for_moral_theory, 72-
86 
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degree must eventually become differences in kind, but such step differences always seem too 
small to justify such a lexical shift.8 Thus, Cowen must offer some explanation for what justifies 
the difference in valuation between two tiers of lives. 
Another objection comes from considering the kinds of actions which can improve the 
value of a world. Imagine a world, A, with fifty billion people living the drab muzak and potatoes 
life. Now imagine a world, B, which is identical except that ten of these people live isolated on an 
island where they have no contact with the rest of the population. These ten people brought muzak 
recordings and potatoes with them to the island and in all respects their lives are like those of the 
rest of the population. One of the people on the island, however, decides to murder the others and 
takes great pleasure in the commission of the deed so that his life is eight times more valuable for 
him than each of the lives of the others was for each of them. The other nine people do not realize 
that the murders are taking place and are in no way pained by the murders, and thus the only 
consequence of the murders is to end their lives. It would seem that the murders have raised the 
value of world B over the value of world A. The marginal value of nine people getting muzak and 
potatoes is insignificant because the worlds have reached, or at least come asymptotically close to, 
the maximum value which muzak and potatoes can provide, while the value of a single person 
living a good life because of the pleasures of accomplishing his goals is undiminished by bounding 
because he is the only person living that category of life. It seems unacceptable that a theory would 
suggest that murder of the innocent can raise the value of the world, particularly when it reduces 
total utility, and thus bounding the value of muzak and potatoes seems problematic. 
A number of replies are open to Cowen. The first reply is that the amount which the lives 
of murderers can contribute to the value of the world is bounded at zero. Thus, the murderer 
                                                          
8 Tim Mulgan, “Two Parfit Puzzles” in The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics, ed. by Torbjorn 
Tannsjo and Jesper Ryberg (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 24-26 
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reduces the value of the world by murdering because he eliminates the small but nevertheless 
positive value of nine lives of muzak and potatoes and adds no other value to the world. Initially 
this approach seems to solve the problem, but now imagine a world, C, just like world B except 
that the murderer takes no pleasure in his actions. The day after the murders he just sits around 
eating his breakfast of potatoes and listening to muzak as if nothing has happened. It seems that 
world C is worse than world B. All things being equal, it is better if one world contains more 
pleasure than another. That response may seem like question begging. It may seem like a mere 
assertion of the repugnant conclusion. If the ceteris paribus clause is taken at its most strict, 
however, the repugnant conclusion is not an inevitable result. My assertion only applies to worlds 
with the same population, the same amount of virtue and vice, the same relation of desert to receipt, 
and so on, and thus does not represent a mere endorsement of the repugnant conclusion. It seems 
that if one world contains more of a good and is in no other way different than another, it must be 
better than that other. Thus, bounding the value which the lives of murderers can contribute to the 
value of the world at zero leads to another unintuitive result. 
Following G. E. Moore, Cowen could counter with the argument that taking pleasure in 
the bad is intrinsically bad, and thus that the fact that the murderer is pleased by his murder makes 
the murder even worse for the world.9 While it may be true that taking pleasure in a bad thing is 
intrinsically bad, it seems to me that it would not be a large enough intrinsic bad to outweigh the 
intrinsic good of the episode of pleasure. Furthermore, the murderer’s pleasure could be renamed 
or reexplained in a way that would not make it a pleasure in the bad, perhaps taking pleasure in 
the fulfillment of a goal or plan. Many moral theories suggest that people have a duty to improve 
the world, so much of the murderer’s pleasure could even be coming from the belief that he has 
                                                          
9 G. E. Moore, Chapter VI: The Ideal in Principia Ethica, (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1988), accessed online at 
http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/, Sections 124-125 
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improved the world by elevating his life into another tier. Under such a description, it seems even 
more unlikely that the intrinsic badness of taking pleasure in an evil would outweigh the intrinsic 
goodness of both the initial pleasure in the murder and the subsequent pleasure in improving the 
value of the world, the value of which would be amplified as a pleasure taken in the good.  
A third option available to Cowen would be to appeal to the ceteris paribus principle 
implicit in comparisons of worlds. Arguments about the repugnant conclusion tend to hold all other 
things equal to avoid debates about whether moral actions or the correspondence of desert and 
receipt contribute to the value of a world. Cowen could thus argue that the murders violate the 
ceteris paribus condition by adding moral wrongs to the world, and that the disvalue of those moral 
wrongs exceeds the positive value of the murderer’s life. This is a reasonable response, but it 
requires that the amount of moral and immoral actions alter the value of the world, which is far 
from clear. It also requires that the murders were a moral wrong, which might not be the case if 
they were motivated only slightly by the disposition to be pleased by murder and far more by the 
desire to improve the value of the world. Furthermore, the case can be amended again to avoid a 
moral wrong while retaining the unintuitive conclusion. Imagine a world, D, like all of the other 
worlds except that the other people have not been murdered but annihilated by a blast of cosmic 
radiation which has also caused the growth of peaches on the island. The remaining man on the 
island might, as a result of the addition of peaches to his diet, live a life that was twice as good for 
him as his previous life, and which made it into the next tier of lives in terms of its value for the 
world. Here the ceteris paribus requirement seems to be infringed far less, but the unintuitive 
conclusion, that the deaths of nine people can be good for the world even when the total utility of 
the world also declines, remains true. 
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Section 1B-The Perfectionist Response 
Another style of response is to maintain that certain goods are so good that a world without 
such goods is worse. Parfit argues that a world without the best things in life, such as the music of 
Mozart, cannot be as good as a world which contains only inferior goods, such as the music of 
Haydn, even is those goods are more plentiful.10 The response from the best things in life fails, 
however, to avoid the repugnant conclusion in cases in which people’s lives are barely worth living 
because their receipt of the best things is life is almost cancelled out by their receipt of many 
pains.11 It also involves dubious claims about the lexical superiority of higher quality goods over 
lower quality of goods, leading to a total neglect of quantity in favor of an exclusive focus on 
quality. 
In “Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion,” Parfit claims that we can assume that the 
repugnant conclusion focuses on a world of the type that he calls “Drab Z.” He says that in Drab 
Z, people live lives barely worth living because they receive exceedingly minimal goods but do 
not receive anything that detracts from the values of their lives. The people in Drab Z lack the 
better things in life, and thus the lexically prior lives of people in world A who live lives very 
much worth living make world A clearly better than Drab Z.12 Parfit conveniently ignores the 
world which he calls “Roller Coaster Z.” In Roller Coaster Z, people live lives that are barely 
worth living because they contain ills almost equal to the substantial goods that they contain.13 The 
lives in A do not seem to be lexically prior to the lives in Roller Coaster Z because the lives in the 
latter contain the same high-quality episodes present in the A lives, but with the addition of very 
                                                          
10 Derek Parfit, “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life” in The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics, 
ed. by Torbjorn Tannsjo and Jesper Ryberg (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 16-20 
11 Parfit arbitrarily assumes a bleak lives version of the repugnant conclusion in Reasons and Persons, 388, but the 
conclusion does not seem to depend on that assumption.  
12 Derek Parfit, “Can we Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion,” Theoria vol. 82, Issue 2, May 2016, 118 
13 Parfit, “Can we Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion,” 118-119 
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low-quality moments which detract from the value of a life. Without lexical priority, the vast 
number of lives in Roller Coaster Z collectively seem to contain more value than the much smaller 
number of lives in World A. If Roller Coaster Z is better than World A, then the repugnant 
conclusion holds because it claims that for every world of people living moderately good lives, 
there is some world of many more people living lives barely worth living. It is not an objection to 
the repugnant conclusion that not all worlds of the generic Z type are better than world A so long 
as at least one world of the Z type is. 
Furthermore, the claim that lives of higher quality are lexically prior to lives of minimal 
quality is also dubious. Parfit criticizes what he calls the “Linear Model.”14 The linear model 
describes a theory of value whereby different episodes of good or ill can be compared to one 
another exactly because their values correspond to positions on a number line. Thus, an exceptional 
ice cream cone might be exactly 4.8 times better than a mediocre oatmeal raisin cookie. Parfit 
claims that this view is naïve and proposes that it fails when confronted with cases such as deciding 
whether Einstein or Bach was a greater genius. In such cases, we might conclude that Bach and 
Einstein are equally good, but that might entail a contradiction when we compare both of these 
two to some third person like Oppenheimer. We might think that Einstein was a greater genius 
than Oppenheimer, but that Oppenheimer was not less of a genius than Bach which would entail 
both that Bach was as great a genius as Einstein and less of a genius than Einstein. Parfit proposes 
that Bach and Einstein might be imprecisely equally good, so that “not less of a genius than” does 
not mean “at least as much of a genius as.” The weaker “not less than” is not transitive so that 
Bach could be not less of a genius than Einstein and Oppenheimer could be not less of a genius 
than Bach without Oppenheimer being not less of a genius than Einstein. Such a non-transitive 
                                                          
14 Parfit, “Can we Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion,” 114-115 
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system requires that Einstein, Bach, and Oppenheimer cannot be placed on a numerical scale, 
because if they could be so placed, then any relations between them would be transitive.  
While imprecision seems reasonable in the evaluations of concepts such as greater genius 
than, it only seems applicable there because greater genius is an incomplete concept. Temkin 
describes an incomplete concept as one that “allows us to make some comparisons between 
[geniuses] as to which is greater but not others… due to the roughness or complexity intrinsically 
involved in the notion.”15 Parfit explicitly claims that incompleteness is not the source of the 
problem but offers no defense of his claim. Genius plausibly describes many different phenomena. 
In contrast, it is plausible that good might only describe one type of phenomenon. Monist theories 
argue for the existence of a single bearer of intrinsic value, such as pleasure. If something like 
pleasure is the only good, then it seems that any two episodes could be compared through the 
concept of desirability. Heathwood argues that “a sensation S, occurring at time t, is a sensory 
pleasure at t iff the subject of S desires, intrinsically and de re, at t, of S, that it be occurring at 
t.”1617 On Heathwood’s view, if an agent desires A more than B, then it seems that A must be more 
pleasurable than B. Exact relations could be found by assessing how much of some very minor 
pleasure or pain (which Heathwood calls uncomfortableness)18 would be required for the agent to 
forego some experience. If I will only forego an ice cream cone for at least three chocolate bars, 
then it seems plausible that the ice cream cone is exactly as good as three chocolate bars. Similarly, 
parity between pleasures and pains could be explored by asking how much of some good would 
                                                          
15 Larry Temkin, "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox,” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 16(2) 1st April 
1987, 145 
16 Chris Heathwood, “The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire,” Philosophical Studies 133 (2007), 32 
17 Fred Feldman suggests a similarly reductionist account of at least sensory pleasures, but he posits that they are 
reduced to attitudinal pleasures which, nevertheless, seem to embody much of the same pro-mental states which 
Heathwood invokes. Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 79-83 
18 Heathwood, “The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire,” 41-44 
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be required in order for you to submit to some evil. We might ask how many ice cream cones I 
would have to give you in order for you to let me punch you in the face and reasonably expect an 
answer. 
Parfit’s response, then, seems to assume some non-monistic account of the good. When we 
introduce comparisons between different types of goods, it seems much more plausible that we 
might not be able to stipulate how much of one equals some amount of another. Parfit’s response, 
however, is inadequate insofar as it assumes that monism is false. The repugnant conclusion is 
axiology agnostic: it is applicable for all descriptions of the good. If a response can only 
satisfactorily avoid the repugnant conclusion on a limited number of accounts of the good, then it 
is inherently unsatisfactory in the absence of a proof for the truth of one of the descriptions of the 
good for which the response obtains. Thus, because Parfit fails to take into account the problem 
posed by Roller Coaster Z, and because his approach only seems to address the repugnant 
conclusion on non-monist theories of the good, it is not adequate in and of itself. Someone might 
try to salvage Parfit’s response by maintaining that if monism leads to the repugnant conclusion, 
then we have additional reason to believe pluralism. If, however, the ethical implications of the 
repugnant conclusion are as minimal as I maintain that they are, then avoiding the repugnance of 
the repugnant conclusion does not offer any meaningful advantage for pluralism.  
 
Section 1C-Justicism 
Fred Feldman proposes a solution to the repugnant conclusion, Justicism, which posits that 
the value of a world is determined not only by how much of what makes a life good people get, 
but also by how much the people who get it deserve it.19 Feldman further claims that all people, in 
                                                          
19 Fred Feldman, “Justice, desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion,” 204 
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virtue of being people, deserve a substantial amount of pleasure.20 When a person receives what is 
good, and deserves it, the value of the good for the world is increased, while when a person gets 
far more than he deserves, or fails to get anywhere near what he does deserve, then the value of 
the world is reduced.21 The addition of desert to the value of a good for the world enables Feldman 
to say that the world composed of quintillions of people eking out a tiny amount of good is not 
merely not the best world, but in fact is abhorrent. Each person seems to get far less than he 
deserves, and each person who falls far short of what he deserved makes the world worse, so the 
world is in fact extremely bad. The world of excellence, on the other hand, is made even better by 
the addition of desert, because the good that each person receives is amplified by the fact that the 
person deserved it.  
While Feldman thus adroitly circumvents the main thrust of the repugnant conclusion, his 
theory leads to some odd conclusions of its own. For one, it seems that the world of infinite people 
barely getting any good could still be better than the world of excellence if the infinite people 
deserved what they were getting. The implication is that a world of people with an iota of desert 
getting a little good might be better than a world of saintly people getting the same good. 
Furthermore, good people living lives worth living might make the world worse if their desert was 
sufficiently higher than their receipt. If people realized that they were unlikely to get much of what 
makes a life good, then in the interest of raising the value of the world, it would behoove them to 
think wicked thoughts, and possibly even to take wicked actions, so that the gap between their 
desert and their receipt would be eliminated. Of course, it might be the case that trying to perform 
morally bad actions in order to make the world better is itself morally good so that these people 
would only make their desert higher by trying to lower it for such a reason. It seems 
                                                          
20 Fred Feldman, “Justice, desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion,” 209 
21 Fred Feldman, “Justice, desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion,” 204-205 
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counterintuitive to believe that the world might be made better by vice and worse by virtue, and 
thus there is some grounds for dismissing Feldman’s theory.  
Feldman attempts to answer this objection by arguing that in order for the desert of the 
people in the infinite world to be so low, then they must have done some atrocious things, which 
would massively lower the values of the lives in that world. In his example, players in a game may 
inflict pain in order to lower their desert. They each inflict substantial pain in the first round, while 
their desert is still high, and thus the value of the world is greatly reduced. Only in the second 
round is there any gain in value, when each person gets the iota of pleasure he still deserves, and 
it fails to compensate for the bad of the first round.22 Feldman’s answer is deceptive, because in 
his example each player gets on net a tremendous amount of uncompensated pain, whereas in the 
infinite world, it is stipulated that everybody gets a slight net pleasure. If instead of inflicting pain, 
the players in Feldman’s example had tried to inflict pain and failed, then they would have 
similarly lowered their desert without violating the stipulations of the example, but, in that case, 
each person would have contributed only the slight net positive of the second round, and thus if 
there were an infinite number of players, that world would have had infinite positive value. 
Feldman might insist that acts of virtue are intrinsically good, and acts of vice are 
intrinsically bad. He would then be able to say that the world of a great many people with a small 
amount of welfare and a small amount of desert would be very bad because, while the desert and 
receipt of those people would be in line, they would have had to commit many morally bad actions 
to lower their desert so far. The intrinsic badness of those actions would outweigh the intrinsic 
goodness of lives with positive welfare proportional to their desert, leading to a very bad evaluation 
of the world. One response is to insist that the moral value of an agent’s actions is just one 
                                                          
22 Fred Feldman, “Justice, desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion,” 212-213 
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component of the value of his life. The all things considered value of a life would thus be obtained 
by adding the moral value of actions to the desert modified welfare value of a life. On such a view, 
the lives of the people who committed many morally bad actions would not be lives barely worth 
living: they would be substantially below the threshold at which a life becomes worth living, and 
thus the fact that the world of many such lives is bad would not be sufficient to show that world Z 
is bad because the people in the morally abhorrent world would not be living lives worth living. 
Feldman, however, argues that intrinsic value for the person and intrinsic value for the 
world are divorced, and thus he would be able to assert that morally bad actions reduce the intrinsic 
value of the world but not the intrinsic value of any given life. If that is the case, a world Z in 
which everyone deserved little because of morally bad actions and received a corresponding 
amount would be very bad because while each life would be barely worth living, each life would 
contribute a net negative amount to the intrinsic value of the world. One problem with such a view 
is that it seems to imply that a world of many people who perform good actions but yet receive 
less than the amount required to live lives worth living might be a very good world. While the 
desert adjusted welfare of their lives would detract from the value of the world, their virtuous 
actions might contribute more to the value of the world. Feldman claims that as receipt increases 
beyond desert, the desert adjusted contribution to the world approaches an asymptote. It seems 
plausible that there would be a parallel occurrence as desert rises past receipt. The more good 
actions the people performed, the more valuable the world would become due to their virtue, while 
the amount which their net negative welfare contributed to the value of the world would eventually 
level out. Eventually, the virtue would outweigh the lack of welfare, with the bizarre result that a 
world with no enjoyment whatsoever, with pain but no pleasure, could be better than a world 
containing vast amounts of pleasure. 
16 
 
 
Section 1D-Acceptance 
A final style of response is just to insist that we ought to accept the repugnant conclusion. 
Torbjorn Tannsjo, a proponent of this response, argues that the life barely worth living is akin to 
the life of an affluent person today.23 He maintains that once we view the life barely worth living 
as not significantly different from the lives that we ourselves lead, we will acknowledge that a 
world of a great many people living such lives is in fact better than a world of many fewer people 
living much better lives. Such a view assumes that the repugnance of the repugnant conclusion 
inheres in the perceptions which people have of what the life barely worth living looks like. In 
particular, Tannsjo implicitly denies that people are repulsed by the theoretical principle that 
quality can be replaced by sufficient quantity, which suggests that most people are not convinced 
by Parfit’s claim that the best things in life are lexically prior to many other good things. To the 
extent to which people feel the intuitive pull of Parfit’s claim, then, they have reason to deny 
Tannsjo’s assertion.  
For the sake of argument, I will grant Tannsjo’s claim that the life of an affluent person 
living in the west is a life barely worth living. Nevertheless, Tannsjo’s view remains problematic 
because it exploits innate Pollyannaism, which David Benatar ascribes to the vast majority of 
individuals, in order to bias our view of the repugnant world.24 Pollyannaism refers to the tendency 
to view our lives as better than they are. Tannsjo insists that our lives are lives barely worth living, 
which transfers our appraisal of our lives as well worth living to the life barely worth living so that 
we also view that life as well worth living. In actuality, however, both our lives and the life barely 
                                                          
23 Torbjorn Tannsjo, “Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion” Utilitas vol. 14(2) (November 2002), 
345 
24 David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 64-69 
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worth living are only barely worth living and thus our overly optimistic evaluation serves to make 
the repugnant conclusion appear far more attractive than it actually is. When we realize that our 
perceptions are biased, the repugnance returns in full force. 
It will help to illustrate the point with an example. Suppose that Jake offers you two choices 
of future diets. The first choice is a diet of nothing but oatmeal for the rest of your life. Sufficiently 
sweetened, each bowl will bring you the slightest amount of pleasure, but not an iota more. The 
alternative is a revolutionary treatment which will remove both the need and the ability to eat 
without changing anything else about your life. If you choose this option, however, you will first 
be treated to ten incredibly delicious feasts which will produce a great deal of pleasure. Of course, 
the cumulative total of tens of thousands of small amounts of pleasure will exceed the pleasure 
from the great meals. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that you would choose the ten exceptionally 
good meals.  
Now imagine that you defer the choice to the next day and go to lunch with a friend. The 
meal is expensive, and the food served is exactly the same oatmeal which you would have received 
if you selected the first diet, but you are having a great time with your friend and cognitive 
dissonance is also working to ensure that your evaluation of the meal is favorable. When you leave 
the restaurant, Jake reoffers the choice of diets, but now he presents the first diet as a lifetime of 
meals exactly as tasty as the one which you just ate. Under the circumstances, you would be much 
more likely to choose the lifetime of oatmeal because your innate distaste for that option has been 
camouflaged by other psychological factors, the association with seeing your friend and the 
cognitive dissonance that will result if you acknowledge that you wasted your money on the food. 
When Tannsjo suggests that the life of an affluent westerner today is the life barely worth living, 
he implicitly ties it to false judgments about its worth in the same way in which Jake does. We 
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should be wary of drawing strong conclusions from an evaluation as optimistic and vulnerable to 
bias as our evaluations of our own lives, and thus the observation that the life of an affluent 
westerner today is a life barely worth living should not change our judgments of the repugnant 
conclusion.  
The significance of Tannsjo’s claim would be easier to evaluate if it could be divorced 
from claims about our lives and lives like ours and thus made less susceptible to our innate biases. 
Perhaps the life of an affluent person in the west today might be comparable to the life of a 
dutchman of the mid-17th century when the quality of life in the Netherlands was very high relative 
to the rest of the world in the way that the western life is today. Imagining a world full of well-off 
dutchmen, however, might still seem quite repugnant. They lacked modern medicine, plumbing, 
and electricity, and were constantly at war with the English, French, and Spanish. My intuition 
that a world full of such lives is good is rather weaker than when I imagine lives like my own. 
Now it might just be the case that I am mistaken about the relative value of lives in the mid-17th 
century Netherlands and the modern west, but I nevertheless think there are grounds to be 
suspicious of our tendencies to overvalue the familiar and thus grounds to doubt the significance 
of Tannsjo’s claim about what constitutes the life barely worth living even if it turns out to be true. 
Even if Tannsjo is right that the life barely worth living looks like an affluent life today, 
and that that revelation substantially changes our intuition about the world full of such lives, it still 
seems that the repugnant conclusion remains repugnant because of the type of moral duties which 
it justifies. Faced with the unsavory ethical implications of the repugnant conclusion, however, we 
can turn to ethical egoism.  
 
Section 2: Ethical Egoism offers a Solution to the Repugnant Conclusion 
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Ethical egoism, roughly speaking, is the view that people are morally required to take the 
available action which maximizes their welfare.25 Even if people are willing to accept the viability 
of ethical egoism, it is not immediately clear how ethical egoism enables them to refute the 
Repugnant Conclusion. In one sense, ethical egoism does not. Ethical egoism, being axiology 
agnostic, does not take a stance on the value theoretic aspects of the Repugnant Conclusion; it does 
not stake a position on the value of worlds. It may just be the case that the world of a great many 
people living lives barely worth living actually is the best world in some impersonal moral sense,26 
but ethical egoism addresses the truly repugnant part of the problem by allowing people to deny 
that the repugnant conclusion gives rise to any substantial ethical implications. 
What kinds of ethical implications might the repugnant conclusion give rise to? The main 
ethical implication of the repugnant conclusion lies in what world an agent would be obligated to 
create. If an agent had to choose to create a world, the agent would have to create a repugnant 
world, A, of a trillion people getting one unit of whatever makes life worth living over a non-
repugnant world, B, of a billion people getting ten units of whatever makes life worth living. He 
would even have to choose world A if the trillion people were replaced by a trillion ladybugs 
getting one unit of whatever makes life worth living.27 These implications are unpalatable to say 
the least because almost everyone believes that it would be at least permissible to choose world B 
regardless of how many myriads of ladybugs with lives barely worth living populate world A. This 
strong intuition suggests that either the value theoretic claims of the repugnant conclusion are 
                                                          
25 I will offer and justify a more precise definition in Section 3 
26 Parfit describes the impersonal moral sense as applying to outcomes, as opposed to persons or acts. He writes 
that “it would be better, in this sense, if fewer people suffer from some crippling illness, or if the Lisbon earthquake 
had not occurred.” (Reasons and Persons, 385) I believe that ethical egoism is compatible with an impersonal moral 
sense on which an outcome is better than another if it contains more total welfare. 
27 Parfit, “Can we avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?” 118 
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wrong or that we must adopt a moral theory which does not derive ethical duties from the claim 
made by the repugnant conclusion. 
Utilitarianism and deontology are unable to deny all of the ethical implications which arise 
from the repugnant conclusion unless they embrace what I will call an only real people matter 
standpoint. So long as they believe that the interests of merely potential people matter, they cannot 
avoid repugnant implications. The utilitarian finds himself in the worst position because he must 
admit that total value is the only morally relevant criterion, and, given the massive sum of 
wellbeing in world A, it is morally required to choose it. The deontologist is on slightly better 
ground because he might be permitted to choose world B depending on the distribution of people 
to whom he has special duties. Nevertheless, if worlds A and B are equal in all other relevant 
attributes, he would have to choose world A because his duty of beneficence is stronger towards 
the people who will exist in world A than those in world B given the far greater total benefit in A 
than B. The deontologist may appeal to the fact that in any practical situation there will be some 
people to whom he has special duties, but nevertheless both the deontologist and the utilitarian 
have trouble convincingly denying both duties derived from the repugnant conclusion.28 
If ethical egoism is correct it allows us to dodge any ethical implications deriving from the 
repugnant conclusion. On ethical egoism it does not matter that the life of another person might 
increase the value of the world if creating that life is not also the available act which maximizes 
the welfare of the agent, and thus nobody would have a moral duty to procreate unless it were 
already in his best interests to do so. Thus, ethical egoism allows the agent to create any world if 
the value of the agent’s life is not affected and is thus silent on the choice between worlds A and 
                                                          
28 My conception of deontology is roughly modeled on the version espoused by W. D. Ross in The Right and the Good 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 20-22. Ross envisions a system of prima facie duties, or features of a case 
which entail moral obligation if no other competing features are present. He describes duties based on promises, 
reparations, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence. 
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B if his life is equally good in either. If, however, the agent will live the same life as the other 
people in the world he creates, then the egoist must choose world B because he will live a +10 life 
instead of a +1 life. Consequentially, if ethical egoism is the correct moral theory, the repugnant 
conclusion becomes an almost completely empty value theoretic conclusion which only matters to 
the extent to which agents care about and are made better off by improving the world. 
Ethical egoism is able to deny the ethical implications of the repugnant conclusion because, 
since the agent is the only person of inherent moral relevance, ethical egoism is a theory with an 
only real people matter stipulation. No merely possible people matter to egoist moral choices 
except insofar as their anticipated lives will affect the value of the agent’s life. Thus, when the 
agent considers a world which will have a vast number of people over the millennia to come, he 
need not consider those future people morally relevant. The world with ten future people who have 
no effect on the agent’s life occasions no differences in ethical duties from the world of a googol 
future people who have no effect on the agent’s life. Other theories with only real people matter 
constraints (henceforth ORP), however, are also able to deny the ethical implications of the 
repugnant conclusion. ORP utilitarianism, for example, does not support a duty to procreate when 
it would be to the disadvantage of existing people to do so because the positive value which the 
potential child would contribute to the value of the world is not morally relevant until the child is 
actual. Similarly, an ORP deontology denies the existence of any duties to future people, and thus 
there is no duty of beneficence to induce the ORP deontologist to give birth to a child, if her duties 
to existing people such as herself, her spouse, and her family are insufficient to induce her. 
ORP utilitarianism and deontology are able to circumvent the requirement to choose world 
A over world B because when the agent chooses between world A and world B, neither world is 
yet actual. Therefore, all of the people in both worlds are merely possible people. The only real 
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people matters variants thus allow both the utilitarian and the deontologist to deny that the lives of 
any of the possible people in worlds A and B are morally relevant. The only morally relevant 
people are those, like the agent himself, who are already existing. The ORP utilitarian requires the 
agent to make the choice which will make him the most well-off. Ex hypothesi, the life of someone 
in world B is better than the life of someone in world A, so the agent is morally required to choose 
world B, and thus the utilitarian gets the result that he wants. Similarly, the ORP deontologist only 
has one duty, his duty to himself, and thus if the choice of world B will make him better off than 
the choice of world A, he also must choose world B. Notably, both ORP utilitarianism and ORP 
deontology work exactly like ethical egoism in this situation because only the agent himself 
matters. 
All three ORP theories are able to deny the ethical implications of the repugnant 
conclusion, but ethical egoism is the most plausible of these three theories because it can get the 
right results in a couple of case in which both ORP deontology and ORP utilitarianism give the 
wrong results. In Train to Pusan, James has promised to go to dinner with his family and friends. 
He will catch the last train from Seoul to meet them at Pusan. He gets to the train station and goes 
to buy the last ticket, but Emily runs up. Emily has an appointment with a renowned fertility 
specialist who is visiting Pusan. If she buys the last ticket, she will make it to Pusan in time for her 
appointment and will conceive Sarah, who will live a life of +100, which is quite good. If she gets 
the last ticket, however, James will miss the dinner, causing 10 relatives and friends each to have 
a life 1 worse than the lives that they would have had otherwise. James is more concerned that 
Emily makes it to her appointment than that he makes it to dinner, and thus his life is 1 better if 
Emily gets the last ticket. Emily herself will have an equally good life either way because the 
unique goods and ills of having a child will cancel out. James knows all of this information. 
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Both ORP utilitarianism and ORP deontology require James to take the last ticket. On ORP 
utilitarianism, the relevant moral factors are the +1 that James will get by handing over the ticket 
and the -1 that each of 10 of the other people at the dinner will get if he hands over the ticket. The 
morally relevant people, then, will lose 9 units of welfare if James hands over the ticket, so ORP 
utilitarianism requires him to keep the ticket for himself. The morally relevant factors look much 
the same for the ORP deontologist although there is some added weight which the disvalue to his 
friends and family acquires because James has special duties to those people and has promised to 
attend the dinner. The duty of beneficence which James might have to Emily is too weak to 
override his special duties of non-maleficence to his friends and family because beneficence is 
often considered to be the weakest duty, because there will be no benefit to Emily beyond the 
fulfillment of a preference, and because Emily is a stranger who cannot lay claim to any partiality. 
Thus, the ORP deontologist must also choose to take the last ticket. 
Intuitively, however, James ought to give the ticket to Emily. The benefit to Sarah is so 
considerable relative to the harm to friends and family that James seems to have very good cause 
to give the ticket to Emily. Ethical egoism, unlike the other ORP theories, is able to agree with the 
intuition that James ought to give the ticket to Emily. James will get +1 if he gives the ticket to 
Emily, and thus the case is open and shut for the egoist: James is morally required to give over the 
ticket. Utilitarianism without the only real people matter stipulation backs up the intuitive 
judgment. Giving the ticket to Emily will create 91 net value because James gains 1 and Sarah 
gains 100, while 10 will be lost in the form of disappointed dinner guests. Deontology without the 
only real people matter stipulation might also return the judgment that James ought to give the 
ticket to Emily because the duty of beneficence becomes much weightier when the beneficent act 
will cause a very substantial positive change in someone’s life, in this case Sarah’s. With that said, 
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however, the deontologist has more room to deny that it is right to give the ticket to Emily because 
the duties which James has to his friends and family might still outweigh the stronger duty of 
beneficence that James has when Sarah’s life is taken into account. Furthermore, the deontologist 
can maintain that the duty of beneficence only operates when there is no duty of non-maleficence, 
and that here James has a duty of non-maleficence to his family and friends. 
A second case, A Brother and a Friend, reinforces the advantage which ethical egoism has 
over the other ORP theories. In A Brother and a Friend, Malcolm’s mother, Edna, will become 
pregnant if she stays home tonight, eventually giving birth to Justin, who will have a life of +100. 
She will stay home tonight if Malcolm, a middle school student, decides not to go the school 
basketball game. Edna is a teacher, and one of Malcolm’s friends, Samuel, is among her students. 
If Edna becomes pregnant, she will take months of leave towards the end of the school year. The 
substitute teacher will not be as good, and thus Samuel will not do as well in the class, with the 
result that his life gets -3. Malcolm, however, will have a +1 life if Edna becomes pregnant due to 
good times he will have with his brother. The value of Edna’s life will not change because the 
positive value which she will get from having another child will be exactly equal to the disvalue 
of lost time at her job and the pain of pregnancy. Malcolm knows all of these facts. 
Intuitively, Malcolm ought to stay home from the basketball game. While Samuel will be 
slightly worse off if he stays home, Justin will gain far more than Samuel will lose. Once again, 
ethical egoism is able to support this intuition because Malcolm will be better off if he stays home 
from the game, and thus, on ethical egoism, he is morally required to do so. The standard versions 
of utilitarianism and deontology also offer some support for this intuition. Normal utilitarianism 
requires Malcolm to stay home because the +100 which Justin gains and the +1 Malcolm gains 
decisively outweigh the -3 which Samuel receives. On normal deontology, the judgment is the 
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same because the special duties which Malcolm has towards Justin, his potential brother, are 
presumably at least as strong as the duties which he has towards his friend Samuel, and thus the 
morally relevant difference is not in the nature of the duties but rather in the amount of value or 
disvalue which the people to whom he has duties will receive. Once again, the deontologist could 
argue that the duty of non-maleficence towards Samuel outweighs any duty of beneficence, but 
when the differences in value are so great, while the partiality which Malcolm owes the two is 
comparable, that seems wildly implausible. To maintain that the harm accruing to Samuel 
outweighs the benefit to Justin is close to asserting that preventing harm is lexically prior to 
providing benefits, which seems clearly wrong in cases in which billions of value of benefit hinge 
on causing a single unit of harm.29  
The other ORP theories, however, once again return the wrong results. The ORP utilitarian 
is forced to admit that it would be better for Malcolm to attend the basketball game because, among 
morally relevant people, Malcolm will lose one value by going to the game while Samuel will gain 
three, for a net increase of two value. Thus, Malcolm is morally required to attend the game on 
ORP utilitarianism. On ORP deontology, the same result obtains because the special duties which 
Malcolm has to himself are comparable to the special duties which he has to Samuel in virtue of 
the fact that Samuel is his friend. The morally relevant difference, then, again comes down to 
relative values which each of them will receive, and the fact that Samuel will gain more than 
Malcolm loses determines the case in favor of Malcolm attending the game. If only ORP theories 
are able to deny the implications that agents must choose world A and that agents have a positive 
duty to procreate, and ethical egoism is able to return the intuitive result in cases in which the other 
                                                          
29 It seems clearly acceptable to subject one person to a mild headache in order to secure bliss for a thousand 
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ORP theories come to the wrong conclusion, then there is good reason to think that ethical egoism 
is the ethical theory best able to solve the repugnant conclusion.  
Someone will certainly object to the cases they have offered, pointing out that there are 
other cases which are not nearly as favorable for ethical egoism. First imagine a case which I will 
call Train to Busan Redux. It is just like Train to Busan except that instead of James getting +1 by 
giving his ticket to Emily, he gets -1 instead. Ethical egoism now requires James to take the ticket 
himself instead of giving it to Emily because his life will be slightly better if he takes the ticket 
himself. Unless that small change has changed the common intuition about the case, it seems that 
all three ORP theories now come to the wrong conclusion. A similar revision gives us A Brother 
and a Friend Redux, in which nothing changes except that Malcolm’s life loses one value when 
he stays at home instead of going to the game. Once again ethical egoism now joins ORP 
utilitarianism and deontology in insisting that the morally correct action is for Malcolm to go to 
the game. These small changes seemingly alter neither the common intuition nor the judgments 
which normal deontology or utilitarianism come to. Ethical egoism, then, seems to be only 
marginally better off than either of the other ORP theories, and thus they seem to be almost equally 
(im)plausible ways to avoid the ethical implications of the repugnant conclusion. 
Furthermore, there seem to be numerous cases in which ORP deontology and utilitarianism 
come closer to the common-sense intuitions than ethical egoism. In any case which does not 
involve any merely possible people, the ORP theories are identical to their normal counterparts, 
and thus far more widely accepted than any form of ethical egoism. Imagine a very simple case, 
Backyard Baseball, in which Robert, wants to play baseball in the backyard. If his brother, Oliver, 
agrees to play baseball, Robert will be hit in the face by the ball, making his life 10 worse than if 
he stays inside. On the other hand, Oliver will have so much fun prior to the injury that the 
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experience will be a net +1 for his life even once the worry about his brother’s injury is subtracted. 
Oliver knows all of this information. Ethical egoism maintains that it is morally required for Oliver 
to agree to play baseball. On the other hand, the other ORP theories both maintain that it is 
impermissible for Oliver to agree to play baseball. The total value of the choice will be -9 once 
Robert’s -10 is added to Oliver’s +1, and thus the utilitarian is clearly against the choice. The 
deontologist is also against the choice because non-maleficence is a particularly strong duty and 
the relation of being brothers gives Oliver reason to be at least as partial towards Robert as towards 
himself. Thus, ethical egoism here seems to be the least plausible of the ORP theories.  
Ultimately, I have to bite the bullet in these cases, but I do have a few caveats to offer in 
defense of my view. First, the common-sense intuition may be skewed by the fact that the average 
person is not considering the case fairly. It seems likely that when asked to consider one of these 
cases, people project themselves into the place of the decision maker, Oliver, Malcolm, or James, 
and then replace the result stipulated for the agent’s life with the result which they expect they 
would experience. Thus, the person evaluating Backyard Baseball might be thinking about how 
worried he would be and how bad he would feel if he hit someone in the face with a baseball, and 
that might contaminate his intuition, given that it is stipulated that Oliver does not feel bad enough 
that the incident is a net negative for his life.30 He might even side against the egoist intuition 
because he thinks that the agent must be evaluating the events from a misguided or malicious 
viewpoint if the agent somehow manages not to be as bothered by the event as the reader thinks 
he ought to be. In order to evaluate the case fairly, the evaluator must make sure that he imagines 
the agent as having received some good larger than the evaluator imagines that he would lose by 
                                                          
30 Having once broken a guy’s nose while playing catch, I know exactly how bad that feels, which is really bad.  
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choosing a seemingly repugnant decision. When the agent properly interprets the case, then I 
contend that he would be much more likely to endorse the egoist intuition. 
Furthermore, ORP utilitarianism seems to completely miss the intuition that underlies 
normal utilitarianism, namely impartiality. One of the most compelling features of utilitarianism 
is that what makes the world good is not the fact that certain people have certain amounts of good, 
but the fact that there is a certain amount of good. Thus, it does not matter who gets a good so long 
as somebody does. I cannot be partial to my friends and family because the world is not better for 
them getting a certain good than for anyone else getting it. ORP utilitarianism, however, is partial 
in favor of presently existing people. On one hand, this does allow the utilitarian to address the 
complaint that it is usually better to make people happy than to make happy people,31 which is 
compelling so long as creating happy people lowers the average value of the world. Prioritizing 
existing people, however, leads to odd cases when the action which makes happy people also 
improves the average happiness of all people. Imagine a world of one person, Dave, who is living 
a life which will be worth +1. Dave can choose to create another person, Bob, who will live a life 
worth +99, or he can choose not to, in which case his life will be worth +2 instead. It seems clear 
that Dave ought to create Bob because both total and average utility are much higher if he does so, 
with the average going to +50 and the total to +100 if he creates Bob, while the average and total 
are both +2 if he does not. Thus, ORP utilitarianism seems not to incorporate the basic utilitarian 
intuitions that more of a good is better, and that we should be impartial in our distribution of goods. 
There is then little positive reason to support ORP utilitarianism except for the fact that it can deny 
the ethical implications of the repugnant conclusion. 
 
                                                          
31 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 394 
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Section III: Ethical Egoism is a Plausible Moral Theory 
Ethical egoism, however, is far more plausible than most people believe it to be. I will 
consider a number of objections to ethical egoism in an effort to show that it is sufficiently viable 
to offer a useful path to avoiding the ethical implications of the repugnant conclusion. First, in 
order to evaluate the plausibility of ethical egoism it is necessary to define it, the more so as one 
major objection to ethical egoism is that it cannot be coherently defined. One intuitive definition 
is that (i) an agent, A, ought to conclude that he should act to promote A’s interest and (ii) A ought 
to judge that others should also act to promote A’s interest.32 G E Moore and Brian Medlin have 
both objected that this definition leads to contradictions. If B acts in B’s own interest and against 
A’s interest, then B judges that he acts as he ought to while according to A he has chosen the wrong 
course. Medlin claims that ultimately everybody ought to do what is in the interest of each other 
person because, when A is the judge, A ought to do what is in A’s interest by (i), as should B, C, 
etc. by (ii), but at the same time when B is the judge, B ought to do what is in B’s interest by (i), 
and A, C, etc. also ought to do what is in B’s interest by (ii) and so on.33 Furthermore, Moore 
maintains that for a thing to be good for someone is for that thing to be good and in someone’s 
possession. Therefore, the state of affairs that constitutes B’s interest is the possession of 
something good simpliciter by B. Moore maintains that it is incoherent for anyone to try to attain 
good only for himself because it is the same good regardless of who possesses it.34 On the basis of 
                                                          
32 Medlin, Brian, “Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism” in Morality and Rational Self-Interest, ed. by David P. 
Gauthier (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 60-61 
33 Medlin, “Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism”, 60-61  
34 Moore, G.E., “Is Egoism Reasonable?” in Morality and Rational Self-Interest, ed. by David P. Gauthier (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 49-51 
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these contradictions Moore and Medlin maintain that the ethical egoist is simply advancing an 
incoherent theory: not merely not talking sense but not talking.3536  
 These objections may be answered by amending the definition. I follow Jesse Kalin’s 
suggestion that the problem lies in the second component, and that to produce a coherent definition 
agent A must judge that B acts correctly when B acts in B’s interest, not A’s.37 Kalin suggests that 
Medlin rejects this approach because Medlin assumes that for A to believe that an action, x, is 
morally right, A must approve of x, and that approving of x requires wanting x to occur. On egoism, 
Agent A, desiring the promotion of his own interests, could not approve of B’s action when that 
action failed to promote his own interest, and thus he could not view that action as morally right. 
Kalin maintains that an analogy with competitive games suggests that people may believe that an 
action is right in some sense without approving of it in the sense of desiring it, as when the manager 
of a football team acknowledges that the other team ought to run down the clock by keeping the 
ball on the ground even as he hopes that they do not.38 If, then, believing an action to be morally 
right does not require wanting it to occur, the path is clear for the ethical egoist to modify premise 
(ii).  
Medlin may still argue that morality is a different beast, and that to believe an action is 
morally correct requires approval in a way that believing an action is pragmatically correct does 
not. It seems, however, that on common sense morality there might be cases in which someone 
believes an action to be morally correct even as he does not want that action to be performed. 
Suppose the manager of a store has been erroneously informed that a particular customer is 
                                                          
35 Medlin, “Ultimate Principle and Ethical Egoism, 61-62 
36 Moore, “Is Egoism Reasonable”, 54-55 
37 Kalin, Jesse, “In Defense of Egoism”, in Morality and Rational Self-Interest, ed. by David P. Gauthier (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 69-70 
38 Kalin, “In Defense of Egoism”, 73-74 
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shoplifting. The manager asks another nearby customer whether he has seen the suspect steal 
anything. That man could do the morally correct thing and clear the suspect, or he could lie. If he 
lies, however, the manager will, in a fit of compassion, pardon the suspect. The moral goodness of 
the act of compassion may be greater than the moral goodness of telling the truth, even when the 
moral wrongness of the lie is subtracted from it. Overall, then, a better outcome might come about 
if the customer lies than if he tells the truth, and thus an impartial observer might not want the 
customer to perform the morally correct action. If the description of the case is correct, then it 
seems that believing an action to be morally right requires only the sort of approval which one may 
grant without wanting the act to occur. 
I will avoid the inconsistency of evaluation which Moore and Medlin object to by defining 
ethical egoism as the theory that an agent, A, performs the morally correct action if and only if he 
performs the available action which maximizes his well-being. Thus, when agent A evaluates his 
own actions, they will be morally correct if they maximize the value of his own life, but when he 
evaluates the actions of another agent, B, they will be morally correct if they maximize the value 
of B’s life. A couple features of this definition ought to be called to attention. First, ethical egoism 
remains coherent regardless of whether the hedonist is right or whether an objective list theory is 
correct or whether some other description of the value of a life obtains. Second, my ethical egoism 
is a maximizing theory: an action is only morally correct if it maximizes the value of the agent’s 
life. An action which benefits the agent but less than another available action is morally wrong. 
Suppose that it is the day after Halloween and a child trades his snickers bar for a kit-kat bar when 
he could have traded it for a Reese’s cup which he would have enjoyed more. Provided that 
pleasure matters to the value of a life, according to my theory, the child has performed a morally 
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wrong action. Of course, so long as the difference in his enjoyment is miniscule, the action is only 
very slightly wrong, but wrong nonetheless. 
Like all maximizing theories, ethical egoism is vulnerable to the objection that it is overly 
demanding. However, the problem looks somewhat different for ethical egoism than for a more 
conventional moral theory like maximizing act utilitarianism (MAU) which requires people to 
perform actions contrary to their self-interest most of the time. For the ethical egoist there is no 
conflict between morality and self-interest because acting morally just consists in acting in accord 
with self-interest. Consequentially, the egoist need not expect people to give moral reasons greater 
weight than self-interested reasons, and thus dodges much of the problem which MAU is 
vulnerable to. Instead, the problem seems to be that ethical egoism undermines autonomy. Suppose 
a man can become a butcher, a baker, or a candlestick maker. He will be happiest if he becomes a 
baker, but only slightly happier than if he becomes a candlestick maker. On the other hand, he will 
be seriously unhappy if he becomes a butcher. Ethical egoism is committed to the judgement that 
the man performs the morally correct action by becoming a baker, and that he acts wrongly if he 
chooses either of the other two jobs. It seems, then, that facts about the world, notably about the 
man’s dispositions and talents, shoehorn him into a very limited moral path. Common-sense 
morality, on the other hand, allows the agent a much greater latitude of amoral action in his own 
life. According to common-sense morality, the man could choose any of the professions without 
committing a moral error, although prudential reasons would rule out the option of becoming a 
butcher. 
The ethical egoist may respond that his theory only undermines autonomy in the same way 
in which all consequentialist theories seem to do so. MAU in particular is vulnerable to exactly 
the same objection and, given that most people are unwilling to discount utilitarianism out of hand, 
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the objection may not be that serious. Alternatively, the egoist could see the objection as 
particularly targeting theories which extend the range of moral judgments into the agent’s personal 
life and thus circumscribe morally appropriate actions more strictly. Some consequentialist 
theories, such as rule utilitarianism, give everyone the same set of duties, and limit these duties to 
areas of choice which are usually seen as morally relevant. Both ethical egoism and MAU, 
however, make it a moral requirement to promote the agent’s welfare, which both gives them the 
ability to extend moral judgments into the seemingly non-moral realm of exclusively self-affecting 
decisions and compels them to do so. Thus, ethical egoism and MAU are particularly vulnerable 
to the objection that they undermine autonomy insofar as they extend moral judgments throughout 
the entirety of the agent’s life and extend a unique and very narrow set of permissible possibilities 
for each person. For the ethical egoist, there are only ever multiple permissible actions when there 
are two or more actions which contribute exactly the same amount of value to the agent’s life and 
there is no other action which contributes more value, which, practically speaking, ordains a single 
moral path for each agent. 
The ethical egoist might reply that agents may exert influence over which course is best 
for them. If somebody greatly desires to achieve something, accomplishing it will have a greater 
value than if he is indifferent. Thus, the man choosing a job can exercise his autonomy by choosing 
to desire to be a candlestick maker or otherwise causing that course of action to yield better results, 
perhaps by studying the craft in his spare time. Aristotle believes that people may, through 
repetition and self-conditioning, alter their dispositions and come to see as good actions which 
they initially were indifferent or opposed to.39 The same tools are open to the egoist who may 
shape his preferences to any object, thereby making the pursuit of that object into the morally 
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correct path for him. Now, the initial expenditure of effort on shaping preferences may run contrary 
to his interests when he could have spent the time pursuing the objectives which he already had, 
and may thus be morally wrong, but his subsequent actions taken in accord with these new 
dispositions will be free from moral blemishes. Shaping morally correct action in such a way is 
analogous to giving your implicitly trustworthy roommate ten dollars on the condition that if you 
take out the trash tomorrow he must give it back to you. While giving him the money today is not 
really in your interest, tomorrow it is certainly in your interest to take out the trash. Thus, the 
ethical egoist may respond that he exercises autonomy by maintaining the ability to shape his 
preferences and thus determine what actions will be morally correct tomorrow, although often at 
the expense of a slight moral wrong today. 
A similar response from preference shifting is not nearly as open to the maximizing act 
utilitarian. The morally correct act for the utilitarian depends on the results for the world as a 
whole. In most cases, shifting the preferences of the agent do not change which action is best for 
the world as a whole, because the consequences of an action radiate out, affecting myriad people 
increasingly removed from the action. The effect of the action on the agent himself is a relatively 
minor portion of the overall moral evaluation under the vast majority of circumstances. Thus, a 
charitable agent might give a child a chocolate bar, causing him to go home in a better mood, 
forestalling a fight with his father, who might then choose not to go to the bar, avoiding a drinking 
bout which would have angered his wife, and saving some money which he might spend at the 
store, pleasing the manager, and so on, and so forth. Even if the agent caused himself not to have 
a preference for giving chocolate bars to children, even if he made himself hate such actions, the 
total consequences of giving the chocolate bar would still make it the morally required action. 
Certainly, it is true that there are exceptions, like the hermit who may be able to change his moral 
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requirements via preference shaping because the consequences of his actions do not fan out in the 
same way.  Preference shifting, however, does not allow the maximizing act utilitarian to avoid 
undermining autonomy in the vast majority of circumstances, although it would change how good 
or bad various actions would be for the agent. 
Maximizing act utilitarianism seems to undermine autonomy more seriously than ethical 
egoism, but deontological theories and common-sense morality also restrict the autonomy of the 
agent. Such theories usually confine their judgments to the sort of actions which we commonly 
think of as morally relevant, and thus do not intrude so deeply into the life of the agent, but where 
they do make judgments, those judgments tend to be immutable. Indeed, the stability and 
impartiality of deontological judgments is one of the main selling points of deontology. If an agent 
desires to do something forbidden by one of these moral theories, there is no way to influence the 
morally correct path through preference shifting, and thus there is a sense in which the agent’s 
autonomy is greatly restricted. It may be the case that these theories are silent on the question of 
whether a man should become a baker or a candlestick maker, but if Kantian deontology is right 
that lying is forbidden, then it might be morally wrong to become a spy instead.40 While, in 
practice, deontological theories will leave many more morally acceptable courses than ethical 
egoism, the single course that ethical egoism leaves open tends to be the one which the agent has 
the greatest desire to take. Thus, there is an interpretation on which the deontological theory is 
more autonomy undermining than ethical egoism: if I want to become a spy more than anything, 
the fact that deontology allows a thousand other morally acceptable careers does not prevent my 
autonomy from being restricted more by that theory than by ethical egoism. Non-agent relative 
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moral theories, then, do not entirely escape the objection of undermining autonomy, even if it is 
usually more serious for agent relative theories such as ethical egoism. 
Another fundamental objection to ethical egoism is that it fails the test of generalization. 
Many philosophers have argued that any adequate moral theory must extend similar duties to 
everyone who finds himself in a similar situation. Kant suggests that considering the consequences 
of everyone following a particular maxim is an effective test of whether that maxim is morally 
valid,41 which suggests that any morally acceptable principle must be applicable in all similar 
situations. In the same vein, Medlin suggests that individual egoism, the principle that I should 
look after myself, is not an ethical theory at all because it is not a general principle, and that it does 
not assert itself as a moral theory unless it manifests itself in the universal form that everyone 
ought to pursue his own good.42 The solution, then, is to put ethical egoism into a universal form, 
as I have done above. 
 
Section Four: Ethical Egoism and Collective Action Problems 
Ethical egoism, however, when stated in a universal form, as in the definition which I have 
offered, leads to collective action dilemmas. Two such notable dilemmas are the tragedy of the 
commons and the prisoners’ dilemma. The tragedy of the commons describes a large scale 
collective action dilemma in which each person acting in his own interest leads to a worse result 
for everyone. Common examples of the tragedy of the commons are situations in which there is a 
communal resource, such as a lake full of fish or a common pasture, which will be depleted if 
people do not limit their consumption. Rush hour traffic provides a more modern example. Each 
person gets to work faster by driving than by taking mass transit, but if everybody takes mass 
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transit, then reduced congestion causes everyone to get to work faster than if everyone drives. One 
person taking mass transit, however, is insufficient to reduce congestion to the point that it is faster 
than driving, and thus driving has a substantial marginal advantage to over taking mass transit.43 
With no incentive to take mass transit, everyone continues to drive, and to suffer longer commutes 
as a result. In both incarnations of the tragedy of the commons, individually advantageous behavior 
leads to universally negative consequences. 
 The prisoners’ dilemma, on the other hand, refers to a particular two-person situation which 
exemplifies the same general characteristics as the tragedy of the commons. If only one of two 
criminals testifies against the other, the criminal who testified will only get three months, although 
the other will receive a full ten years. In the event that both of the criminals testify, then each of 
them will receive eight years. The criminals, Jones and Smith, have no chance to confer and thus 
must decide independently. Regardless of what Jones does, Smith ought to testify against his 
partner. If Jones also testifies against him, then Smith will receive eight years instead of ten, while 
if Jones does not testify against him, then Smith will escape with a mere three-month sentence. 
The exact same logic applies to Jones. Thus, each criminal, acting rationally, will testify against 
the other and both will get eight years, whereas if both had kept silent, they would each have 
received a mere year. Once again, following the rational course seems to lead to a disastrous 
result.44  
Collective action dilemmas have always presented a problem for theories of rationality, but 
they seem to present a much greater problem for ethical egoism. The existence of collective action 
dilemmas shows that the actions which self-interest theories of rationality claim are justified lead 
to disastrous consequences when generalized, but the problem is worse for ethical egoism because 
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ethical egoism claims that those same actions are not merely rationally justified but morally 
justified. Thus, ethical egoism seems to catch agents in a quandary. Either they can do the morally 
correct action and drive to work, making the situation marginally worse for everyone, or they can 
take a morally wrong course by taking the bus. Agents no longer even have the option to weaken 
the dilemma by weighting their moral reasons more heavily than their self-interested reasons 
because moral reasoning has been collapsed into self-interested reasoning. It seems, then, that 
ethical egoism gives rise to the most full-blooded endorsement of the type of self-serving actions 
which give rise to collective action dilemmas. In Parfit’s terminology, ethical egoism has revealed 
itself as directly collectively self-defeating,45 and thus has cast serious doubt on its claim to be an 
adequate moral theory. 
 In order to answer the objection, the ethical egoist must show that a good egoist is not never 
self-denying. To be never self-denying is to always take the action which produces the greatest 
benefit. In Reasons and Persons, Parfit identifies one case in which being never self-denying leads 
to a very bad outcome. Suppose Bill is driving in the desert without his wallet when his car breaks 
down. Another motorist, George, comes along and is willing to drive Bill home, but only if Bill 
agrees to pay him upon arrival. Bill knows that, once he is home, there will be no self-interested 
reason to pay George because Bill needs no additional services from him, and because Bill is never 
self-denying, Bill knows that he will then refuse to pay. With no contract and no witnesses, George 
will not be able to bring suit or otherwise penalize Bill for not paying. Unfortunately for Bill, he 
cannot lie convincingly, so, knowing that he will refuse to pay, he is unable to convince George 
that he will pay, with the result that George leaves him in the desert.46 Kavka’s toxin puzzle seems 
to be another case in which being never self-denying makes someone worse off.  In the puzzle, an 
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eccentric billionaire offers to pay you a million dollars tomorrow morning for intending tonight to 
drink a toxin which will cause serious discomfort tomorrow afternoon. One who is never self-
denying, however, knows that, once he has the money, there will be no reason for him to drink the 
toxin tomorrow, and thus he cannot intend to drink it today.47  
 One intuitive way to get the money in the toxin puzzle is to trick yourself about the nature 
of the case. Perhaps you convince yourself that you will not deserve the money unless you actually 
drink the toxin so that getting the money and not drinking the poison becomes the second-best 
option instead of the best, or perhaps you deceive yourself into believing that you actually like 
drinking the toxin in order to get the money. If you can represent to yourself that the best path is a 
path in which you drink the toxin, then you can get the money. If it is the case that you cannot 
honestly intend to drink the toxin while fully understanding the deal, then it becomes the case that 
deceiving yourself actually is the best path. The mechanism used here is similar to the preference 
shifting offered as a response to the problem of infringement of autonomy. By shifting what you 
sincerely believe will get you what you want, new options become open to you in which what you 
want to do aligns with what will make you well-off.  
Whenever a problem seems unavoidable, then the ethical egoist has cause to shift his 
preferences so that the problem becomes less serious. Suppose that Elizabeth has a fulfilling job 
in the city which is the best job available to her, but which requires her to commute a long distance 
each day. All of the commuters have reason to drive to work, because driving is faster than taking 
the bus, but because everybody is driving, the commute is longer for everybody than if everybody 
took the bus. It seems that the order of possible states of affairs, from best to worst for Elizabeth, 
is Elizabeth driving while everyone else takes the bus, everyone including Elizabeth taking the 
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bus, everyone including Elizabeth driving, and everyone else driving while Elizabeth takes the 
bus. The only available states of affairs, however, are the third and fourth worst ones because 
Elizabeth cannot control the actions of the other commuters, and thus Elizabeth is highly 
displeased with her commute because the better possibilities are not available options. If Elizabeth 
shifts her preferences so that an available option becomes the best possible option, however, then 
the gap between the best possible and the best available will no longer exist to trouble her with 
how much better things could be. Thus, it seems that Elizabeth will be better off if she shifts her 
preferences so that a longer commute is a good thing. Perhaps she might come to enjoy the time 
which she has to herself in the car, in which case Elizabeth driving while everybody else drives 
would be the best option because it would afford her the most time in the car. Alternatively, she 
might become an avowed environmentalist so that only options in which she rides the bus would 
be appealing to her, although there would still be a better possible option, namely everybody riding 
the bus.  
While preference shifting seems to provide some sort of a response in the commuting 
collective action dilemma, it does not seem to be a very convincing response. Preference shifting 
doesn’t truly solve the problem but merely claims that it is not really a problem. In fact, it seems 
to lead to the conclusion that no intractable problem is a problem because once it is clear that it is 
not solvable, the agents involved shift their preferences so that whatever was initially taken to be 
a problem becomes the best outcome. On one hand, there may be a grain of truth in the claim that 
the best path to happiness is aligning your desires and expectations with what will in fact result, 
but, on the other hand, the implications seem highly problematic in the case of the communal 
fishing pond.  
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In the fishing pond case, if all the villagers have agreed to take only a certain number of 
fish, there is a difference between the states of affairs which are best in the short-term and those 
that are best in the long term. Thus, in the short-term, the ranking of possibilities from best to worst 
in terms of value for an individual, Ronald, is Ronald cheating on the communal agreement while 
nobody else does, everyone including Ronald cheating, nobody cheating, and everybody but 
Ronald cheating. In the long-term, however, nobody cheating becomes better than everybody 
cheating because if everybody cheats, the resource is seriously diminished. In the short-term, there 
is little incentive to preference shift because the best available option, everybody cheating, is 
almost as good as only Ronald cheating. When everybody cheats, the decline in available resources 
is minimal in the short term and thus has only a slight impact on Ronald’s short-term interests. In 
the short-term, Ronald is close to impartial between being the only one to cheat, and everybody 
cheating. When nobody ever has a short-term interest in preference shifting, however, the long-
term result comes about and suddenly there are no fish in the pond. It then seems absurd to argue 
that Ronald shifting his preferences to hate fishing or hate having the extra resources leads to a 
satisfactory result. It might even be the case that that was the only food supply and now Ronald 
will starve. It would be ridiculous to insist that Ronald, having shifted his preferences to hating 
eating, is now well off on account of his imminent death. It cannot be satisfactory to insist that 
people may always shift their preferences to reimagine collective action dilemmas as the best 
possible outcome, although it may be the case that once Ronald is starving to death, it is good for 
him to shift his preferences to align with the inevitable outcome. 
When preference shifting intersects with the problem of seeking happiness, however, a 
more compelling response emerges. It is widely agreed that nothing is so anathema to happiness 
as trying to be happy, and that fact in itself has been leveled as an objection against ethical 
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egoism.48 In her paper “Moral Saints,” Susan Wolf argues that the utilitarian moral saint must 
always consider whether his current action is best promoting total welfare, and that doing so 
prevents him from ever really enjoying anything. His fixation on welfare value prevents his life 
from contributing much at all in the way of welfare to the global total.49 It seems likely that a 
similar problem exists for the never self-denying ethical egoist. He must always consider whether 
his actions are best promoting his welfare, which consideration prevents him from ever living in 
the moment. In Wolf’s words, he has one thought too many, and this additional thought prevents 
him from living as good a life as he might be able to do otherwise.50 If following ethical egoism 
leads to a worse life than following some other moral theory, then it seems that ethical egoism may 
be failing in its own terms. 
If ethical egoism tells people to do that which will make their lives go best and trying to 
have a good life makes one’s life go worse, then ethical egoism tells people not to try to make their 
lives go best. Instead, once somebody has accepted the truth of ethical egoism, then the morally 
correct action for him to take is to forget that he is an ethical egoist. So long as it is before his mind 
that he is an egoist, he will be motivated to always take the action which most promotes his welfare, 
causing him to be never self-denying, but being never self-denying involves having one thought 
too many and being unable to secure certain benefits in cases such as the desert breakdown or the 
toxin puzzle. Instead, the egoist ought to efface egoism from his mind in favor of some other moral 
theory, the belief in which will allow him to live the best possible life. In practice that theory is 
probably a widely accepted and not overly demanding theory such as common-sense morality, 
although likely with some personal modifications. Thus, it might be reasonable for a compulsive 
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liar to adopt a moral theory which does not hold that lying is morally wrong so that he does not 
have to condemn himself morally on a daily basis. While it may seem that ethical egoism has just 
disappeared at this point, it remains the case that ethical egoism would still be the epistemically 
justified moral theory, even if some other moral theory were the pragmatically justified theory.  
If ethical egoism is a self-effacing theory, then collective action dilemmas are not nearly 
so great a problem as they initially seemed to be. Once people have effaced the never self-denying 
interpretation of egoism, they would be inclined to act in a conventionally moral fashion. It seems 
likely that the moral theory which egoism was effaced in favor of would give some weight to the 
interests of other people in order to avoid conflicts and their attendant risks, and thus it is likely 
that egoists would have moral seeming reasons to take community-oriented actions such as abiding 
by the agreement to only take so many fish from the communal pond. Furthermore, collective 
action dilemmas were only a particular problem for egoism because the never self-denying 
interpretation of egoism suggested that the ethical egoist was not merely permitted but morally 
required to take actions which exacerbate dilemmas. With the never self-denying interpretation 
having been effaced, ethical egoism no longer provides any additional support for patterns of 
action which lead to collective action dilemmas and is thus no more guilty of promoting such 
problems than any other common moral theory. 
The self-effacing interpretation of ethical egoism has implications for another, weaker 
objection to ethical egoism, the objection that so few people historically have professed any sort 
of ethical egoism. If ethical egoism were a plausible theory, the objection maintains, then far more 
people would believe it. If ethical egoism is self-effacing, however, that objection seems far less 
plausible. If anyone who accepts ethical egoism has both a strong moral and a strong rational 
reason to forget that he accepts ethical egoism, then it should not be at all surprising that there are 
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no self-professed ethical egoists on the streets. Furthermore, even if ethical egoism were not self-
effacing, it would not be that surprising to find few people claiming to be egoists because of the 
opprobrium with which such an announcement is usually greeted and the corresponding difficulty 
in securing future cooperation from other people. It would also often be the case that an egoist 
parent would be better off teaching his children some other moral theory lest they find themselves 
morally barred from supporting him in his old age. In fact, he would probably be morally required 
to inculcate in them such morals as would make them most inclined to treat him with respect and 
reverence. Thus, even if many people acknowledge ethical egoism as true at some point, regardless 
of whether or not it is self-effacing they would be disinclined to promulgate their doctrine because 
it might redound to their disadvantage. 
Of course, the argument that there are few apparent egoists because ethical egoism may 
not be circulated abroad leaves ethical egoism vulnerable to yet another objection, that a true moral 
theory must be the kind of thing which it is good to make known. Here conceiving of egoism as a 
self-effacing theory is essential to the response. If egoism is a self-effacing theory which leads 
people to something approaching common-sense morality, then it is not disadvantageous to 
propagate it. In fact, it might turn out to be a pleasure of sorts to explain to others that the 
implications of ethical egoism are not the oft maligned ones that they are generally conceived to 
be but are in fact largely consistent with standard conceptions of morality. Now, somebody could 
only spread ethical egoism before it was completely effaced from his mind, but, in that interim 
period, spreading ethical egoism would not have any particularly deleterious effect. Of course, it 
may also prove morally acceptable just to spread the theory in favor of which one is effacing or 
has effaced ethical egoism, but the force of the objection that ethical egoism is unsuitable for 
propagation consisted in the fact that it was reprehensible and detrimental to the agent to do so, 
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not in the fact that one might prefer to spread something else. Rule utilitarians might also find it 
more efficacious just to spread the rules that their theory approves and not the principle underlying 
it. Once the ethical egoist may claim that there are some situations in which it is permitted to spread 
ethical egoism without reservation, he has successfully avoided the objection. 
 
Section 5: Egoism and the One-Person Repugnant Conclusion 
One consequence of the egoist response to the repugnant conclusion is a seeming 
acceptance of the one-person repugnant conclusion (OPRC). The OPRC moves the focus from the 
evaluation of worlds to the evaluation of lives, exchanging lives barely worth living for moments 
barely worth living. Simply put, the one-person variant is the conclusion that for any life of several 
dozen years of high quality life, there is another, better, life of far more years that are barely worth 
living.51 Each day will be barely worth living, or even a complete wash, but over the course of 
each year, there will be just enough days that are worth living, albeit barely, that the year as a 
whole represents a positive contribution to a life. On Parfit’s formulation of the life barely worth 
living, instead of living a normal human life, the OPRC maintains that it is preferable to live for 
many hundreds or thousands of years during which you enjoy nothing but Muzak and potatoes.52 
Many people view the one-person conclusion with as much repugnance as the general repugnant 
conclusion, and thus the egoist response must provide some answer to avoid the general 
disapprobation with which people regard theories which accept the one life repugnant conclusion. 
 Egoism seems to embrace the one-person repugnant conclusion and render it of practical 
relevance because it instructs people to act so that their lives are as valuable as possible. The 
common assumption is that egoism is totalist, that is to say that it evaluates a life based on the sum 
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of atomic units of good and bad experienced throughout the life. The life of very many years barely 
worth living is a life of very many atomic units of good, and thus egoism seems to adjudge that 
life as very good. It is not clear, however, that egoism is committed to a totalist account of the 
good life. The egoist could instead back an averagist account of the good life, in which the best 
life was the life with the highest average good per unit of time or some sort of hybrid model in 
which both the average and total welfare affect the ultimate evaluation of the life. Nevertheless, 
while these approaches have the potential to avoid the individual repugnant conclusion, they lead 
to other deeply counterintuitive conclusions, including that adding blissful lives to a world might 
make that world worse if the current average exceeded the value of a merely blissful life.53 These 
approaches were also available as tools to undermine the general repugnant conclusion, but their 
innate implausibility renders them inadequate for either task. 
 Another approach for the egoist is to deny totalism by promoting a theory of organic 
unities. Instead of the value of a life being entirely dependent on the atomic units of value within 
that life, it might be the case that lives can only be evaluated as wholes.54 Just as the beauty of a 
garden can exceed the sum of the beauty of the individual flowers, the value of a life might depend 
on context dependent factors such as the ratio of the various constituent elements of positive value 
or the exemplification of flourishing characterized by the receipt of diverse goods. Thus, a life 
containing a vast amount of the pleasure of eating potatoes might be worse than a life containing 
far less total pleasure, but which contains an admixture of pleasures from knowledge, friendship, 
love, and sensory perceptions because the diversity of pleasures multiplies the sum by a 
considerable factor. This move seems initially plausible because most people have the intuition 
that a life of a thousand years of eating potatoes with a total pleasure of perhaps (+1000) is worse 
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than a life of a thousand years in which there are a diversity of normal human pleasures but in 
which the sum of the pleasures is a mere (+800). It does not seem that repugnant to call an 
extremely long life containing a typical blend of human activity, but with exceedingly muted 
pleasures, quite good. 
 In order for a response to the OPRC to be adequate, it must be able to resist the arguments 
which justify the general repugnant conclusion. Parfit first supports the general repugnant 
conclusion with the impersonal total principle, which states that, ceteris paribus, the best world is 
the one which contains the most of whatever makes life worth living.55 He later reinforces the 
conclusion with the benign addition argument, which maintains that adding new lives worth living 
does not reduce the value of a world, so that a world A+ which contains 10 people with lives of 
(+10) and 10 people with lives of (+1) is not worse than world A which only contains the 10 people 
with lives of (+10). He then proceeds to argue that leveling out the two groups of people in world 
A+ in such a manner that total utility also increases slightly yields a world, B, with 20 people living 
lives worth (+6) which is better than A+ because it is more equal, has greater utility, and makes 
the worst-off people better off. Repeated applications of adding more people and leveling out the 
world eventually leads to the repugnant world Z, with a vast number of people living lives barely 
worth living.56 
 The organic unities approach is able to address both arguments for the general repugnant 
conclusion. The argument from the impersonal total principle is rejected by the theory of organic 
unities because a life could contain more atomic units of whatever makes a life worth living while 
yet scoring worse if a multiplier like the suggested diversity multiplier is in place. The impersonal 
total principle might still hold if the ceteris paribus clause is held to mean that the two lives are 
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identical in respect to whatever else is relevant to the evaluation of lives, so that, if diversity of 
pleasure is important, life A would be better than life B if it contained at least as much of each 
kind of good present in world B, but that is not a radical claim and leaves open the possibility that 
a normal human life could be preferable to a very long life which only contained the repeated, 
muted pleasures of eating potatoes.57  
 The organic unities approach also decisively undermines the benign addition approach. 
The benign addition argument starts with the move from A to A+, which, in the context of the 
OPRC, involves the claim that taking a normal human life of several dozen years which are quite 
worth living, life A, and adding years of life barely worth living yields a life, A+, which is not 
worse than life A. This move, at least, seems justified. Once one has lived a normal human life, 
getting bonus time at any quality of life which is worth living seems more like an improvement 
than a detriment. The repugnant conclusion results if B is either at least as good as or better than 
A+ because people would then be required to choose world B over world A given a binary choice. 
The next move, however, to life B, does not seem nearly as plausible. The move to life B requires 
leveling out life A+ so that the years of the normal human life, A, are no longer present in their 
original form. In the context of the general repugnant conclusion, the value of equality and the 
plausibility of a maximin principle drive this move.58 In the context of single lives, however, 
neither equality nor maximin makes much sense. While there seems to be something unfair in a 
world where some people live much better lives than others, there does not seem to be any 
corresponding unfairness in a life in which some moments are much better than others. Suppose 
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reducing the amount of certain pleasures without any corresponding increases in other areas. 
58 Parfit describes maximin as the principal that “The best outcome is the one in which the worse-off people are 
best off.” (Reasons and Persons, 422) He then applies it to the move from A+ to B on page 426 
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that you are offered a job for the next year. You will, however, only be paid for one week’s work, 
but the pay during that week is quite high and so you agree to take the job. The fact that you are 
only paid for one week is not intrinsically bad and you do not seem to have any grounds for 
grievance. Now imagine that someone hires 52 workers but pays one of them for the work of all 
of them. Clearly this does not seem to be fair, and the other 51 workers do have a legitimate cause 
for complaint. Equality, then, seems to matter between persons in a way that it does not matter 
between times. Furthermore, if equality between the moments of a life is not intrinsically valuable, 
there is no reason to believe that any sort of a maximin principle applies to lives. Improving the 
worst moments of a life at the cost of the best moments only seems justified in the context of a life 
when it improves the total value of a life, unlike in the context of worlds in which it may be 
permissible to lower the welfare of the best-off more than the welfare of the worst-off is raised. 
 In the original benign addition argument, the leveling-off move from world A+ to world B 
did in fact increase the total utility. As Larry Temkin notes, the move from A+ to B is supported 
by appeals to equality, maximin, and total utility, and only opposed by an appeal to 
perfectionism.59 In the context of a single life, however, maximin and equality have ceased to 
provide any justificatory value, and thus total utility alone is pitted against perfectionism which, 
according to Temkin, is the belief that “A is better than B if some of A’s members are better off, 
or live fuller, richer lives, than the members of B.”6061 Here the notion of organic unities returns 
to do valuable work. It seems plausible that some features of the normal human life are uniquely 
valuable in a way in which the moments of the leveled down life are not. So long as it preserved 
                                                          
59 Larry Temkin, "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox,” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 16(2) 1st April 
1987, 155 
60 Temkin, “Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox,” 155 
61 Not to be confused with Perfectionism as referring to the quality of the constituent moments of value in a life 
expressed by Parfit in “Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion,” 117. Parfit calls Temkin’s concept Elitism. (Reasons 
and Persons, 427) 
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the entire life A intact, it seemed obvious that adding more time to A+ did not create a life at all 
worse than life A, but once leveling out begins, some essential features of a life might be 
imperiled.62 The leveled-out life is missing some of the best things in life. It might lack diversity 
of goods, or intensity of goods, or some other value which multiplies the atomic units of good in 
a life.63 Thus, organic unities prevent the benign addition argument from proving decisive in lives 
because they make the move from A+ to B uncompelling on many reasonable descriptions of the 
factors which make a life valuable. 
If lives are organic unities whose values are not the mere sum of atomic units of value, it 
seems that worlds might be the same way. If the value of worlds is not a mere sum of the value of 
individual lives, then the repugnant conclusion might fail in the context of worlds in addition to in 
the context of lives. There are, however, reasons for thinking that the value of worlds might be the 
sum of the values of individual lives even if the value of a life is not the sum of the individual 
moments contained within it. If both lives and worlds are the sum of the value of the individual 
lives or moments, respectively, contained within them, double counting might result. In the case 
in which a diversity of goods multiplies the base value of those goods, a life containing a diversity 
of goods is better than a life containing an equal amount of base goods but less diversity. Suppose 
that the life with a diversity of goods is twice as good as a mono good life. It seems plausible that 
the base good of worlds is determined by the values of the lives contained within them. Now 
                                                          
62 One objection is that the shape of a life might contribute to its value. A long period of life barely worth living might 
then lower the value of a life by changing it’s progression for the worse. Nevertheless, the move from A to A+ holds 
in cases in which the low value part of the life is put at the beginning or in the middle. Furthermore, this kind of 
assertion only strengthens the claim that the organic unity approach can undermine the OPRC, and thus does not 
constitute an objection. Feldman considers whether the shape of a life impacts its value in Pleasure and the Good 
Life, 125-141, and concludes that it does not do so intrinsically, although the shape of a life probably produces 
pleasures and pains which do have intrinsic value (Thank you to Professor Swenson for bringing this to my attention.)  
63 A B life might contain both great goods and substantial evils so that the net value at any moment would be close 
to zero. This version of the B life still contains the best things in life despite not containing the A life in its original 
form. Nevertheless, this life scores lower on perfectionism because its best moments are not as good as those in A 
or A+, and thus perfectionism may be sufficient to justify the preferability of lives A and A+. 
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imagine a world, Plurus, containing 10 diverse lives with 10 base good, 1 base good from each of 
ten different sources. Plurus has a base value of 200 because the value of each life once the 
multiplier has been imposed is 20. Now imagine another world, Solus, which contains 10 lives 
each with 10 base good solely from eating potatoes. The base good of Solus is only 100 because 
there is no multiplier for the 10 base value of each life. If Plurus and Solus are organic unities 
which obey the same multiplier rule as lives, the base value of Plurus would be multiplied by two 
again to 400 while that of Solus would be an unaltered 100. While it seemed plausible, ex 
hypothesi, that a diverse life was twice as good as a one pleasure life, once that increased value is 
compounded at the world level, it leads to the implausible conclusion that Plurus is four times 
better than Solus. Double counting has unreasonably inflated a real but exaggerated advantage.  
We might try to solve the problem by making the base value of a world equal to the sum 
of the base values of its lives, instead of the sum of the total values of its lives. Nevertheless, such 
an approach leads to odd conclusions when individual lives are homogenous, but each life contains 
pleasures different from those of the other lives. Imagine two worlds: one of them is Plurus from 
the previous example, while the other, Solus2 contains ten lives, each of which has only one type 
of pleasure, but none of which contain the same pleasure as the other lives. One life contains the 
pleasure of eating potatoes, while another contains the pleasure of lasting friendships, and a third 
contains the joy of knowledge. Intuitively, Plurus is better than Solus2 because each of the lives 
in Plurus is well-rounded while each of the lives in Solus2 is seriously limited in the scope of its 
goods. Plurus and Solus2 have the same base value because they each contains 10 lives with 10 
base value, and they both have the same level of diversity because they each have 10 units of 10 
different goods, thus both Plurus and Solus2 have the same multiplier value and are purportedly 
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equally good. Once again, applying the particular conception of an organic unity based on diversity 
of pleasures to worlds has yielded unintuitive outcomes. 
Furthermore, even if worlds are organic unities, it is not clear that that enables them to 
avoid the repugnant conclusion. Once again, we must test the arguments for the general repugnant 
conclusion in the context of organic unities. Like in the context of lives, organic unities cause the 
impersonal total principle to become almost meaningless because it only operates when all other 
relevant considerations are equal, and the ceteris paribus clause is forced to do so much work that 
the claim becomes very weak. The worlds are only equal in every other relevant factor when one 
world is equal or greater in every category of what makes a life good. Therefore, it would no longer 
be sufficient for a world A to have more of what makes a life good than world B, but it would also 
have to have at least as much pleasure from knowledge and pleasure from beauty etc. Otherwise, 
there could be a world which had a higher total of things which make a life good than a world A, 
but which was worse because it had only one category of pleasure while the lower base amount of 
pleasure in world A was multiplied by a greater factor because of its equal distribution of pleasures 
across several categories. World A might have +1000 pleasure from potatoes but might be worse 
than world B because world B has +300 pleasure each from friendship, knowledge, and potatoes, 
the diversity of which multiplies the total by a factor of 2. World A would only be guaranteed to 
be better than World B if it had +300 pleasure from both friendship and knowledge in addition to 
the +1000 pleasure from potatoes. Technically, the weakened impersonal total principle still 
supports a minimal version of the repugnant conclusion under which World C with +1001 pleasure 
from potatoes is better than world A with only +1000 from potatoes, but this weaker conclusion is 
not nearly as repugnant as the former conception. 
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 With the impersonal total principle enfeebled, the benign addition argument emerges as the 
main support for the robust repugnant conclusion. The benign addition argument is predicated on 
the claim that adding additional lives worth living to a world does not make it worse, even if it 
does not necessarily make it any better. Even if worlds are organic unities, it seems plausible that 
this claim remains true. If adding more of a good without any corresponding bad could make a 
world worse, it would follow that removing some goods could make the world better. For those 
who subscribe to Epicurus’ view that death is not intrinsically bad, that might result in the 
unfortunate implication that there are times when the world is made better by killing people with 
lives worth living.64 The resulting problem would closely resemble the key objection to averagism, 
notably that it implies that killing all but the happiest people would make the world better. At the 
least, it would imply that it would have been better if those people had never lived. Thus, at the 
world level, as at the level of lives, the benign addition argument is able to justify the move from 
A to A+. 
 At the world level, however, the benign addition argument is still able to justify the move 
from A+ to B. In the context of lives, equality between the moments of a life did not seem to be 
the kind of thing which made a life better. In fact, if that equality meant that some of the best things 
in life were lost, it might even make a life worse. Now that we have returned to worlds, however, 
equality once again seems capable of justifying the move from A+ to B. The value of equality is 
entirely consistent with worlds as organic unities. In fact, it seems implausible that there are atomic 
units of equality that could even be totaled because equality is a relational property between 
different entities, as opposed to a property of a single entity like being pleased or performing a 
                                                          
64 Konstan, David, "Epicurus", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/epicurus/>. (Section 4: Psychology and 
Ethics) 
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virtuous action.65 Thus, envisioning worlds as organic unities does not undermine the general 
repugnant conclusion despite the fact that evaluating lives as organic unities offers a compelling 
solution to the OPRC. 
In this thesis I have considered the problem posed by the repugnant conclusion. I have 
suggested that the ethical implications of the repugnant conclusion are the source of the repugnance 
which philosophers such as Parfit have felt when confronted with it. I have argued that ethical 
egoism allows us to circumvent these ethical implications, and that it is sufficiently viable to make 
it a promising avenue for avoiding a thorny problem. 
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